1 sn The one who hates his fellow Christian. The author’s paradigm for the opponents portrays them as those who show hatred for fellow Christians (Grk “brothers,” but not referring to one’s physical siblings). This charge will be much more fully developed in chap. 3, where the author will compare the opponents to Cain (who is the model for one who hates a brother, since he ultimately murdered his own brother). In 1 John 3:17 the specific charge against the opponents will be failing to give material aid to a brother in need.
2 sn 1 John 2:3-11. The section 2:3-11 contains three claims to intimate knowledge of God, each introduced by the phrase the one who says (participles in the Greek text) in 2:4, 6, and 9. As with the three claims beginning with “if” in the previous section (1:6, 8, 10), these indirectly reflect the claims of the opponents. Each claim is followed by the author’s evaluation and its implications.
3 tn Once again there is the problem (by now familiar to the interpreter of 1 John) of determining whether the phrase ἐν τούτῳ (en toutw) in 3:10 refers (1) to what precedes or (2) to what follows. If it refers to what precedes, it serves to conclude the unit which began with 2:28. The remainder of 3:10 would then form a transition to the following material (another “hinge” passage). On the other hand, if the phrase ἐν τούτῳ refers to what follows, then the entirety of 3:10 is a summary statement at the end of 2:28-3:10 which recapitulates the section’s major theme (conduct is the clue to paternity), and provides at the same time a transition to the theme of loving one’s brother which will dominate the following section (3:11-24). Although R. E. Brown (Epistles of John [AB], 416) prefers to see the phrase as referring to the preceding material, it makes better sense to refer it to the remainder of 3:10 that follows, and see the entirety of 3:10 as both a summary of the theme of the preceding section 2:28-3:10 and a transition to the following section 3:11-24.
4 tn See note on the term “fellow Christian” in 2:9.
5 tn Here βίος (bios) refers to one’s means of subsistence – material goods or property (BDAG 177 s.v. 2).
6 tn See note on the phrase “fellow Christian” in 2:9.
7 tn Here a subjective genitive, indicating God’s love for us – the love which comes from God – appears more likely because of the parallelism with “eternal life” (ζωὴν αἰώνιον, zwhn aiwnion) in 3:15, which also comes from God.
8 sn Once again the verb μένω (menw) is used of a spiritual reality (in this case the love of God) which does or does not reside in a person. Although the author uses the indefinite relative whoever (Grk ὃς δ᾿ ἄν, Jos d’ an), it is clear that he has the opponents in view here. This is the only specific moral fault he ever charges the opponents with in the entire letter. It is also clear that the author sees it as impossible that such a person, who refuses to offer help in his brother’s time of need (and thus ‘hates’ his brother rather than ‘loving’ him, cf. 3:15) can have any of the love which comes from God residing in him. This person, from the author’s dualistic ‘either/or’ perspective, cannot be a believer. The semantic force of the deliberative rhetorical question, “How can the love of God reside in such a person?”, is therefore a declarative statement about the spiritual condition of the opponents: “The love of God cannot possibly reside in such a person.”
9 sn How can the love of God reside in such a person? is a rhetorical question which clearly anticipates a negative answer: The love of God cannot reside in such a person.
7 tn Again ἐάν (ean) in 5:16 introduces (as in 5:14) a third-class condition, but this time, with the future indicative (αἰτήσει, aithsei) in the apodosis, the condition is known as “more probable future.” As BDF §371.4 points out, such a condition describes what is to be expected under certain circumstances. If a person sees his Christian brother committing a sin not to death, it is expected that he will make intercession for the sinning brother (“he should ask…”), and that life will be granted to the sinner in answer to the request. The author has already pointed out in 5:14-15 that if believers make requests of God in accordance with his will they may have confidence that they will receive the requests they have asked for, and this is a specific instance.
8 tn See note on the phrase “fellow Christian” in 2:9.
9 tn Grk “a sin not to death.”
10 tn Grk “he” (see the note on the word “grant” later in this verse for discussion).
11 tn The referent of the (understood) third person subject of δώσει (dwsei) in 5:16 is difficult to determine. Once again the author’s meaning is obscure. Several possibilities have been suggested for the referent of the subject of this verb: (1) From a grammatical and syntactical standpoint, it would be easiest to understand the subject of δώσει in 5:16 as the person who makes the request, since this person is the subject of the preceding verb αἰτήσει (aithsei) and the following verb ἐρωτήσῃ (erwthsh). From a theological standpoint this is extremely difficult, however, since it would make the person who prays for the sinner the giver of life, and it is questionable whether the author (for whom God is the ultimate source of life) would say that one believer could ‘give’ life to another. In this case the meaning would be: “he [the petitioner] should ask, and he [the petitioner] will grant life to him [the sinner], namely, to those who sin not to death.” (2) Another option is to see God as the subject of δώσει in 5:16 and the Giver of life to the sinner. This is far more consistent theologically with the author’s perspective on God as the Giver of life everywhere else, but it is awkward grammatically (as explained in reference to the previous position above) because it involves a shift in subjects for the three third-person verbs in the context from the person who makes the request (αἰτήσει) to God (δώσει) and back to the person who makes the request (ἐρωτήσῃ). In this case the meaning would be: “he [the petitioner] should ask, and he [God] will grant life to him [the sinner], namely, to those who sin not to death.” (3) A third possibility is to see God as the subject of δώσει in 5:16, but the person who makes the request (rather than the sinner) as the referent of the indirect object αὐτῷ (autw) in 5:16. This is possible because the indirect object αὐτῷ is singular, while the dative substantival participle τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν (toi" Jamartanousin) which follows (which clearly refers to those who sin) is plural. Thus the meaning would be: “he [the petitioner] should ask, and he [God] will grant life to him [the petitioner], with reference to [his praying for] those who sin not to death.” Although this is a difficult and awkward construction no matter what solution one takes, on the whole the second alternative seems most probable. Even if option (1) is preferred it must be acknowledged that God is ultimately the source of life, although it is given as a result of the petitioner’s intercessory prayer and the petitioner becomes, in a sense, the intermediate agent. But in the preceding context (5:11) the author has emphasized that God is the Giver of life, and in spite of the awkwardness in the change of subjects, that would seem to be the most likely meaning here, so option (2) is preferred. Option (3) is improbable because it seems clear that it should be the sinner for whom intercession is made, rather than the petitioner, who is the recipient of life. The petitioner would be assumed to possess life already or he could not be making a request which God would hear. In this case the change from the singular dative indirect object (αὐτῷ) to the plural dative substantival participle (τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν) is merely a loose construction (which by this time should come as no surprise from the author).
12 tn Grk “a sin not to death.”
13 tn Grk “a sin to death.”